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Cutting down the dissonance: the psychology of gullibility
Two years ago, 14-year-old Nathan Zohner, a student at Eagle Rock Junior High in Idaho Falls, announced on the Internet that he had circulated a petition demanding strict control of a chemical known as dihydrogen monoxide. This substance, he wrote, caused excessive sweating and vomiting, can be lethal if accidentally inhaled, contributes to erosion, and has been found in tumors of cancer patients. The student asked 50 people whether they supported the ban. Forty-three said yes, six were undecided, and only one knew that dihydrogen monoxide was… water.
While embracing a ban on H2O seems more foolish than dangerous, this anecdote shows how quickly people embrace some kinds of ideas without subjecting them to critical scrutiny. The human propensity to accept ideas at face value—no matter how illogical—is the fertile soil in which pseudoscience grows. Beliefs in UFOs, astrology, extrasensory perception, palm reading, crystal therapy, or guardian angels do not meet scientific criteria for rational plausibility (such as experimental reproducibility or Karl Popper’s idea of falsifiability) and generally rely on anecdotes instead of hard evidence for support, though they may partake of scientific-sounding terms or rationales; all such concepts can be safely described as pseudoscience. Why do people embrace irrational belief systems even after repeated disconfirmation by scientists?
It is easy to dismiss these ideas as amusing and eccentric, but in some situations they pose concrete dangers to individuals; they occasionally even affect society. Former First Lady Nancy Reagan revealed in her autobiography that she employed a psychic for seven years to schedule dates for important meetings; more recently, Hillary Rodham Clinton admitted to having imaginary conversations with Eleanor Roosevelt on the advice of New Age guru Jean Houston. These public figures are hardly alone in seeking answers from the stars and soothsayers; the persistence and popularity of such beliefs reflect the many perceived benefits in pseudoscience. Psychologists agree that all belief systems — astrology, Objectivism, religion — ease anxiety about the human condition, and provide the illusion of security, predictability, control, and hope in an otherwise chaotic world.
Scott Lilienfeld, assistant professor of psychology at Emory University and consulting editor at the Skeptical Inquirer, identifies two major catalysts for the prevalence of pseudoscientific beliefs: the information explosion (often a misinformation explosion) and the low level of scientific literacy in the general population. He cites poll data indicating that only 7 percent of the population can answer basic scientific questions like “What is DNA?” or “What is a molecule?” And when science cannot provide answers, or when people refuse to accept a scientific explanation (such as when fertility treatments don’t work), pseudoscience often provides highly individualized explanations. “People believe in things like astrology because it works for them better than anything else,” says Herbert Gans, the Robert S. Lynd professor of sociology at Columbia. “Your own system is the most efficient one, whether it’s a guardian angel, a rabbit’s foot, or a God watching over you. And if it doesn’t work, there’s always an excuse for it.”
Another reason people find pseudoscience plausible is a cognitive ability to “see” relationships that don’t exist. “We have an adaptive reflex to make sense of the world, and there is a strong motivation to do this,” says Lilienfeld. “We need this ability, because the world is such a complex and chaotic place, but sometimes it can backfire.” This outgrowth of our normal capacity for pattern recognition accounts for the “face on Mars” (a group of rocks that allegedly resembles a face) or the belief that a full moon causes an increase in the crime rate. When people believe in something strongly — whether it is an image on Mars or a causal interpretation of a chronological association — they are unlikely to let it go, even if it has been repeatedly discounted.
In some cases, contradictory evidence can even strengthen the belief. As Leon Festinger and colleagues discussed in When Prophecy Fails, holding two contradictory beliefs leads to cognitive dissonance, a state few minds find tolerable. A believer may then selectively reinterpret data, reinforcing one of the beliefs regardless of the strength of the contradictory case. Festinger infiltrated a doomsday cult whose members were convinced the earth was going to blow up; when the date passed and the earth didn’t explode, the cult attributed the planet’s survival to the power of their prayers. “When people can’t reconcile scientific data with their own beliefs, they minimize one of them—science—and escape into mysticism, which is more reliable to them,” says Dr. Jeffrey Schaler, adjunct professor of psychology at American University.
Belief systems tend to respond to challenges according to this pattern, says Lilienfeld. When researching a cherished belief or coming across information about it, a person may process the data as if wearing blinders, registering only the affirming information. The malleability of memory compounds this effect. “Once you have a belief, the way you look at evidence changes,” says Tory Higgins, chair of the psychology department at Columbia, whose research specialty is mechanisms of cognition. “When you search your memory, you are more likely to retrieve information that will support it and avoid exposure to information that will disconfirm it. If you fail to avoid it, you attack the validity and credibility of the source, or categorize it as an exception.”
Dr. Robert Glick, head of the Columbia Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research, calls belief systems “societal pain relievers.” “People will recruit anything from their environment that will ensure and protect their safety,” he says. “It gives you a sense that you’re not alone, and helps ease feelings of being powerless.” Power—whether an increase in a person’s perceived power or an abdication of it—is a major component of pseudoscience, and Glick explains people’s relations to power in Freudian terms. He describes belief systems as a metaphoric representation of our parents, providing a release from authority and responsibility. “People have a built-in predilection that wishes for assistance and support. This is an extension of childhood, where there were always people around us who control our life. Beliefs like astrology and even religion are a projection that there are forces in the heavens that are like your parents.”
While it may be fun to read horoscopes in the newspaper, can real harm come from believing strongly in pseudoscience? Lilienfeld advises citizens to consider how pseudosciences pose concrete threats by weakening critical thinking and minimizing a person’s sense of control and responsibility. For individuals, this phenomenon can translate into thousands of dollars wasted on quack remedies—not to mention the medical danger to patients who forgo more reliable treatments. The risks extend to the societal level. “We need to be able to sift through the information overload we’re presented with each day and make sound judgments on everything from advertising to voting for politicians,” Lilienfeld says.
Gans offers a more forgiving point of view. “If someone believes strongly in something like guardian angels, and they’re not in a mental hospital, and we haven’t provided a better answer, why not?” says Gans. “But if you’re just sitting inside your house all day and say, ‘Well, my guardian angel is going to take care of everything,’ then that’s bad.” And perhaps not too far from supporting a ban on dihydrogen monoxide.
If it’s the last, you’ll like it the best. That is the finding of a new study published in Psychological Science, a journal of the Association for Psychological Science.
“Endings affect us in lots of ways, and one is this ‘positivity effect,’” says University of Michigan psychologist Ed O’Brien, who conducted the study with colleague Phoebe C. Ellsworth.
Graduation from college, the last kiss before going off to war: we experience these “lasts” with deep pleasure and affection - in fact, more than we may have felt about those places or people the day before.
Even long painful experiences that end pleasantly are rated more highly than short ones ending painfully.
But does the last-is-best bias obtain in everyday life, with insignificant events? It does, the study found. Moreover, says O’Brien, it doesn’t even have to be a real last one to be experienced as best. “When you simply tell people something is the last, they may like that thing more.”
(More on the study)
Why is this so? The authors have a few theories.
Among these: “It’s something motivational,” says O’Brien. “You think: ‘I might as well reap the benefits of this experience even though it’s going to end,’ or ‘I want to get something good out of this while I still can.’”
Another, says O’Brien: “Many experiences have happy endings - from the movies and shows we watch to dessert at the end of a meal - and so people may have a general expectation that things end well, which could bleed over into these insignificant or unrelated judgments.”
The findings of what O’Brien humbly calls “our little chocolate test” could have serious implications. Professors marking the last exam may give it the best grade even if it’s not objectively better than the preceding ones. Employers may be inclined to hire the last-interviewed job applicant. Awareness of this bias could make such subjective judgments fairer.
Of course, endings don’t bring up only positive emotions, O’Brien notes. Often there’s also sadness about loss - that bittersweet feeling.
If its bittersweet chocolate and the last one you think you’ll eat, however, chances are the taste will be sweet.
“When The Last Is Best”, Medical News Today
Self-serving bias
“We don’t see things as they are,” says a proverb. “We see things as we are.”
Dawes (1990) proposes that this false consensus may occur because we generalize from a limited sample, which prominently includes ourselves. Lacking other information, why not “project” ourselves; why not impute our own knowledge to others and use our responses as a clue to their likely responses?
Most people are in the majority; so when people assume they are in the majority they are usually right.
Also, we’re more likely to spend time with people who share our attitudes and behaviors and, consequently, to judge the world from the people we know.
On matters of ability or when we behave well or successfully, however, a false uniqueness effect more often occurs (Goethals & others, 1991). We serve our selfimage by seeing our talents and moral behaviors as relatively unusual. For example, those who use marijuana but use seat belts will overestimate (false consensus) the number of other marijuana users and underestimate (false uniqueness) the number of other seat belt users (Suls & others, 1988). Thus, we may see our failings as relatively normal and our virtues as relatively exceptional.
To sum up, self-serving bias appears as self-serving attributions, self-congratulatory comparisons, illusory optimism, and false consensus for one’s failings.
from: Social Psychology - David G. Myers
Your brain won’t allow you to believe the apocalypse could actually happen
by Analee Newitz
You may love stories about the end of the world, but that’s probably because, deep down, you don’t believe it could ever happen. But that’s not because you’re realistic. It’s actually a quirk of the human brain, recently explored by a group of neuroscientists, which prevents us from adjusting our expectations about the future — even if there’s good evidence that bad things are about to happen.
A group of researchers from Germany and the UK designed a fairly complex psychological test to determine how people planned for negative events in the future. First, they asked the about the likelihood of 80 different disturbing events happening, such as contracting a fatal disease or being attacked. After they’d recorded people’s responses, researchers told each subject the actual, statistical likelihood of such events happening. In some cases, people had overestimated the likelihood and in some cases they’d underestimated it.
(Source: io9.com, via psychologybits)
Selective exposure theory
This theory of communication posits that individuals prefer exposure to arguments supporting their position over those supporting other positions.
As media consumers have more choices to expose themselves to selected medium and media contents with which they agree, they tend to select content that confirms their own ideas and avoid information that argues against their opinion.
People don’t want to be told that they are wrong and they do not want their ideas to be challenged either. Therefore, they select different media outlets that agree with their opinions so they do not come in contact with this form of dissonance. Furthermore, these people will select the media sources that agree with their opinions and attitudes on different subjects and then only follow those programs.
Illusion of Asymmetric Insight
We commonly believe that we understand others better than they understand us.
The rationale for this stems from our external, objective viewpoint and the assumption that the other person has a significant blind self, whilst our own blind self is small.
There is also asymmetry in the reverse situation — we believe we understand ourselves better than others understand us and may feel insulted if they try to show they understand us more than we do.
The same effect happens for groups, where the in-group believes they understand out-groups better than out-groups understand them.
Overall, this is a position where we generally assume we know more than others, perhaps because we know more about what we know.
Research:
Pronin et al found that college roommates believed that they knew themselves better than their roommates knew themselves.
Example:
In an argument with another person you tell them what they are like in great detail because clearly they have very little self-knowledge. They argue back telling you things about yourself that are clearly wrong or that you knew anyway. How can people be so stupid?
Using it:
Be cautious about judging others and assumptions that they do not know themselves. When others try to read your mind, forgive them their foolishness. Do not be drawn into slanging matches.
References: Pronin, Kruger, Savitsky and Ross (2001), Source
Tendency to attribute others‘ behavior to enduring dispositions (e.g. attitudes, personality traits) because of both:
Possible explanations:
The Planning fallacy is the tendency to underestimate the time needed to complete tasks. The planning fallacy actually stems from another error, The Optimism Bias, which is the tendency for individuals to be overly positive about the outcome of planned actions. People are more susceptible to the planning fallacy when the task is something they have never done before. The reason for this is because we estimate based on past experiences. For example, if I asked you how long it takes you to grocery shop, you will consider how long it has taken you in the past, and you will have a reasonable answer. If I ask you how long it will take you to do something you have never done before, like completing a thesis or climbing Mount Everest, you have no experience to reference, and because of your inherent optimism, you will guesstimate less time than you really need. To help you with this fallacy, remember Hofstadter’s Law: It always takes longer than you expect, even when you take into account Hofstadter’s Law.
Interesting Fact: “Realistic pessimism” is a phenomenon where depressed or overly pessimistic people more accurately predict task completion estimations.
The Bias blind spot is the tendency not to acknowledge one’s own thought biases. In a research study conducted by Emily Pronin of Princeton University, participants were described different cognitive biases such as the Halo Effect and Self-Serving Bias. When asked how biased the participants themselves were, they rated themselves as less biased than the average person.
Amazingly, there is actually a bias to explain this bias (imagine that!). The Better-Than-Average Bias is the tendency for people to inaccurately rate themselves as better than the average person on socially desirable skills or positive traits. Coincidentally, they also rate themselves as lower than average on undesirable traits.
The decision to grant a prisoner parole is not something to be taken lightly. It should be considered as seriously and objectively as possible. As a new study of Israeli judges shows, however, these decisions are influenced by a lot more than the lofty ideals of justice. They’re also influenced by snacks.
The researchers investigated the percentage of parole cases that were given favorable rulings. They found that as mornings wore on, the judges became less favorable. But after a meal break, they became more favorable again—followed by the same downward trajectory. The Economist has a figure that says it all: Hungry judges give less favorable rulings.
Perhaps it’s not surprising that people get grumpy when they are hungry. (There’s even a term for it: hangry.) But two things are interesting here. First, hunger had huge effects on a decision that should be, and presumably was, taken very seriously. The scale of the finding itself is pretty amazing. Second, like the judges in the study, most of us underestimate the effect hunger has on on behavior. This both curious and fascinating. Here are two reasons why it happens.
Correspondence Bias
We don’t pay attention to hunger because of the correspondence bias (aka the fundamental attribution error). I assume you do things because of who you are, not because of environmental influences. If I see you drive over a curb, I assume you’re a terrible driver; I don’t attribute your mistake to the screaming kids in the back seat. (If I drive over the same curb the next day, though, I blame the kids in my backseat.)
The correspondence bias makes me ignore the fact that you are hungry when I make judgments about you. This can make me think you’re a jerk when you’re really just grumpy. But it’s more insidious: If I’m hungry, I might think you’re a jerk because I’m grumpy, but I’ll attribute the problem to you. If we weren’t subject to correspondence bias, we might be more aware of how internal states like hunger affect us.
Self-Experimentation
Record some data! That’s what one of my undergraduate professors, Allen Neuringer, used to tell me. If you start to examine your own life, he promised, you’ll see patterns that are often obvious as soon as you start to pay attention. And he was right.
For example, inspired to record some data, one day I counted the strokes it took me to swim a lap in the pool. Every trip across the pool took exactly 21 strokes, no matter how fast I swam. I had no idea it was that consistent. The same was true when I counted steps on a treadmill; my pace (i.e., footfalls per second) remained basically constant regardless of how fast I was running.
These are not hidden signals among a complex web of information. Yet I had never noticed them. Hunger can be like that. We underestimate it because we don’t pay attention to it. Just ask the judges.
Pay attention to how your body affects your mind. You can learn a lot. For me, being hot, hungry, and tired is the worst. That’s probably true of most people and it’s not exactly groundbreaking. The important thing is to be aware of it, and to try to control yourself. And to recognize that people around you are probably not themselves if they’re hot, tired and hungry too. It might make you a better person, and it might improve your relationships too.
No doubt judges who hear parole requests are suddenly becoming aware of how much hunger affects them. We could all benefit from doing the same.
